Objective With the advancement of China’s construction of a “national network” of oil and gas pipelines, the traditional one-part pricing system has struggled to meet market demands. In contrast, a two-part pricing system, which allocates risks through a combination of fixed and variable charges, is better adapted to the fluctuating dynamics of the natural gas market and promotes the effective allocation of resources.
Methods Taking transport distances into account, based on a Stackelberg game model involving upper-level pipeline network enterprises and lower-level users, a two-part pricing model for natural gas pipeline transportation tariffs is proposed: unit pipeline capacity subscription fees plus the products of rates and transport distances. This paper presents the design of an allocation priority mechanism to guarantee urban gas supply and explores pricing strategies and pipeline capacity allocation aimed at maximizing the benefits for both pipeline network enterprises and downstream users. Additionally, sensitivity analysis was carried out from the perspectives of price sensitivity, transport distances for urban gas supply, and the influences of market saturation on pipeline transmission pricing and pipeline network benefits. Furthermore, several pipelines such as the Jining Pipeline, Pingdingshan−Taian Branch, and Second Sichuan to East Gas Transmission Pipeline, were selected to compare the differences between the “one-part system” and “two-part system”, thereby verifying the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed model.
Results The analysis based on the Jining Pipeline, utilizing Matlab software, yielded the following results: (1) The fixed charges within the two-part pricing model enhance tariff optimization for natural gas pipeline transportation, ensuring pipeline network benefits. (2) In scenarios with high price sensitivity, the pipeline capacity fees may be appropriately reduced to sustain the user base. (3) Increased market saturation can lead to improved pipeline network benefits and a higher utilization rate of the pipelines. Additionally, pricing is subject to changes influenced by fluctuating supply and demand. (4) As the transport distance for urban gas supply increases, pricing adjustments are made at critical points for rate increases. (5) Pricing that considers transport distances is adaptable to market changes, which is essential for ensuring energy supply stability, controlling costs, and enhancing service quality, all contributing positively to market development.
Conclusion The two-part pricing model based on the Stackelberg game model is feasible for optimizing resource allocation and adapting to market changes. The findings from this study offer valuable insights for the reform of the natural gas market pricing mechanism.